McNamarat World Bank thinking applied to a whole region rather than an individual country. If the Report is representative, concern for reduction of inequalities, provision for basic needs, and alleviation of absolute poverty appears to have fallen in the Bank's ranking of priorities. Equity and distribution concerns have been supplanted by a re-emphasis upon the growth of production, and upon the adoption of 'outwardoriented' policies as a means of adjustment in the face of structural balance of payments problems. This policy change has coincided with the expansion of general balance of payments lending by the Bank, in support of approved 'structural adjustment' programmes. The Accelerated Development Report is the strongest general statement to date of the policy change. It is also the most detailed public exposition of the kinds of programmes the Bank would be willing to support with structural adjustment lending.
While this evolution in World Bank thinking has been rapid and recent, the International Monetary Fund has been moving towards a complementary position over a longer period. Since the introduction of the Extended Fund Facility (EFF) in 1974 (with three years for disbursements and up to 10 years for repayments) the Fund has steadily increased the volume of resources devoted to longer term 'stabilisation' or 'adjustment' programmes, and has broadened the scope of these programmes to couple the traditional emphasis on demand restraint with policies directed toward easing supply constraints.
These policies normally consist of trade and payments 'Accelerated Development was in fact drafted during President McNamaras administration. However, its tone and priorities are distinctly different from those of his crusade against absolute poverty. 'In the last three years, the Fund has substantially increased its total volume of lending, and has also sharply raised the proportion of new lending which is extended on terms of full conditionality. In Africa attempted programmes reached record levels during 1980-81, but disbursements have lagged because of a high rate of programme suspension. Nevertheless the main thrust is clear: while total aid should be increased, bilateral donors should scale down aid for development projects and contribute instead to support for Bank-designed structural adjustment programmes. It is the combination of proposals for national policy reform with proposals for re-direction of aid which endow the Report with potential to have a tremendous impact -especially, but not only, on African countries.
The Domestic Policy Diagnosis
After an opening discussion of the serious effects on African economies of international economic developments in the 1970s; of the continuing obstacles to development inherited as part of the colonial legacy; and of climatic and other geographical difficulties faced in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), the Report concentrates upon three critical 'domestic policy inadequacies' which it considers have impeded economic growth: first, trade and exchange rate policies have overprotected industry, held back agriculture, and absorbed much administrative capacity. Second, too little attention has been paid to administrative constraints in mobilising and managing resources for development; given the widespread weakness of 3A Fund EFF Programme does not, however, guarantee a Bank structural adjustment loan, as became clear in Tanzania in 1980. planning, decision-making, and management capacities, public sectors frequently become overextended. Third, there has been consistent bias against agriculture in price, tax and exchange rate policies. [World Bank 1981a:4] In looking at the implications of the Report for aid flows and practices, it is worth pausing to consider the origins of these three arguments.
The first is an adaptation of the World Bank's welltaken criticism of 'inward-orientation' in trade and exchange rate policies (summarised in World Bank [198 lb:63-78] 
Aid and Conditionality
The concept of conditionality is now central to the World Bank's efforts to convince donors that there are alternatives to the traditional methods of disbursement. In the face of past failures of recipient government policy and administration the Report argues that the effectiveness and accountability of aid should be safeguarded through alternative means. It rejects the practice of detailed intervention in the processes of public administration, in favour of using the leverage which aid disbursement in large quantities can provide to force recipients to adopt general policy measures. It is implied that these will lessen the scope for governments to misuse aid. The issue of the geographical allocation of a fixed quantity of aid, and of the selection of governments deemed 'aid-worthy', is approached by the same means. The adoption of structural adjustment and development policy pack-14 ages along the lines proposed in the Report will serve as the criterion for aid-worthiness.
The original purposes of conditionality attached to ¡MF lending for balance of payments support were to ensure that a member in deficit would repay its debt, and that it would conform to the Fund's articles of agreement. In this sense, conditionality was simply an extension of the covenants commonly included in loan agreements between private lenders and borrowers. Fund conditionality, however, soon came to be made up of policy packages designed to ensure debt repayment and conformity with international exchange and trade relations rules. Given that Fund lending was of short maturity, and designed to deal with shortterm problems, the policy packages which conditionality required were narrowly focused on demand restriction (to bring about the most rapid possible transition to external balance) and on measures to reduce payments restrictions. In large part because the Fund was heavily criticised for this short-term and narrow approach, it moved into longer-term EFF lending in 1974. More recently it has increased its own borrowing to devote more resources to extended programme lending in the current world recession.
The Fund has also revised its conditionality guidelines [1979] , and begun to stress the importance of 'supply factors' in adjustment. In practice, this has meant an increased Fund interest in public sector operations (cg tax policy and the management of public enterprises) and in measures to remove pricing distortions. The thrust of the Report's argument is that there is a need for a large-scale shift towards the new structural adjustment type of lending. The final chapter of the Report, however, contains recommendations for donors which are more modest in scope, and are evidently constrained by current practices and interests in aid commitment. The Report makes a plea for an increase in non-project assistance, but acknowledges a need for continued project lending and calls for harmonisation of aid procedures without explicitly asserting that these should be subordinated to Bank-Fund structural adjustment programmes.
In fact the World Bank's own structural adjustment lending programme has so far taken up only a small proportion of total Bank and International Development Association (IDA) resources. By the end of the 1981 fiscal year, the Bank had lent just over US$1 bn for structural adjustment. This was equivalent to six per cent of the total World Bank and IDA lending programme [Landell-Mills 1981 18] . Structural adjustment programmes were agreed with eight countries, of which four were from SSA (Senegal, Kenya, Mauritius and Malawi).
Although the volume of resources devoted to these programmes is still rather limited, the extent to which comprehensive conditionality is involved is already becoming clear. 
